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THE BENJAMIN REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATION
HENRY

S.

FRASER

The able and comprehensive report of Commissioner Robert M. Benjamin
to the Governor of the State of New York, submitted in March, 1942, on the
subject of administrative adjudication in that State, is the result of a threeyear study by the Commissioner and his staff. Although the investigation was
directed to conditions in New York State, the report is replete in its 369 pages
with illustrations and conclusions of universal significance in the field of administrative law. Nor does the existence of the war detract from the importance of this report-indeed, the effective and just conduct of representative
government is perhaps even more vital in wartime, and it is one of the ideals
we now seek to preserve.
The report is of more than usual interest to the general practitioner. It is
not concerned with the minutiae of procedure before a particular administrative board, and therefore of interest chiefly to a specialist; rather, the report
delves into the difficulties common to the nature of all administrative process,
and contains profound and at the same time practical analysis of present
abuses, with suggestions for reform. Every lawyer, whether or not he
appears regularly before one or more commissions or boards, should be deeply
concerned with the trend in modern days toward administrative government in
fields that involve the operation of discretion and of adjudicatory technique.
'These matters touch to the heart the ideals and standards cherished especially by the legal profession.
Put in its most general terms, the report is concerned with "the problem of
reconciling, in the field of administrative action, democratic safeguards and
standards of fair play with the effective conduct of government." Commissioner Benjamin accepts as necessary the enlarging area occupied by administrative action "if government is to be effective in the expanding fields of
social and economic legislation in which its intervention is thought desirable."
Therefore he has not undertaken to judge the desirability of the existing
substantive provisions of law which govern particular fields of administrative
activity, but has limited himself to procedural aspects.
The Commissioner wisely has observed that more can be accomplished in the
direction of ideal procedures through voluntary improvement by the administrative agencies themselves, than can be achieved by legislation, necessary as
the latter may be in some instances. "Many of the intangible aspects of administrative procedure, such as the proper attitude of the administrator
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towards the proceeding and the parties before him, are in their nature incapable of legislative control." 1'
But, says Mr. Benjamin, not only the attitude of the administrator, but the
form of the procedures themselves should be such as to result in a confidence
on the part of the citizen that he is being fairly dealt with. "In appraising
procedures and suggesting change, the objective should not be mere conformity with the due process clause of the Constitution. Many forms of procedure are consistent with due process, and the most satisfactory may call for
much more than due process alone would require." And, holds the Commissioner, the existence of judicial review, even if broader in scope than currently
the case, is not the real cure for the improper conduct of a hearing or for the
unfair decision of a board. The judicial correction of the result does not
eliminate the expense and delay; nor should it be forgotten that those who have
frequent dealings with an agency are often loath to sunmon that agency to the
bar of a court. "The fear of retaliation is, I believe, rarely justified, but
there is no doubt that the reluctance exists." Thus, many a present injustice
may be tolerated rather than run the risk of future and perhaps greater injury
inflicted as the aftermath of court proceedings.
QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

The Place of Policy
Mr. Benjamin is of the view that an administrator's concern with the policy
of the statute which he applies does not disqualify him for unbiased adjudication. For example, the interpretation of the statute by the administrator may
call for consideration of policy; or the determination of the penalty to be
imposed for a particular offense may require a discretion guided by policy.
"But," Mr. Benjamin maintains, "policy should play no part in the decision
of questions of fact; policy, rightly understood, cannot call for the decision of
a question of fact in a particular way."
Thus, whether a liquor manufacturer has violated a statute should be
determined as a fact wholly apart from any consideration of policy; but
policy may come into play in determining the penalty, although, even here, the
policy should be applied with fair-minded deliberation. Indeed, says the
Commissioner, fair adjudication is itself a fundamental part of policy, and

'How true this is! To the writer of the present article it appears futile to seek by
statute to instill a passion for due process of law and for the constitutional protection
of every person in the land. Such a passion nourishes the soul only of him who, regardless
of phrases in the laws, loves the liberty of his neighbor equally with his own. If this passion is rarely witnessed today, it is not because it has never existed in the history of the
United States. The Constitution itself, however it may be tortured today by determined
administrator or court, is proof of the fact that such love has animated statesmen of a
former time.
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the particular object of. a given statute will be furthered in the long run by
impartial decisions of fact and by the agency's reputation for unbiased
judgment.
In this connection Mr. Benjamin makes one highly important point, namely,
that the subordinate personnel of an agency should not labor under a misapprehension of the attitude of the head of the agency. It is not uncommon
that a subordinate assumes that his own future 'success depends upon the
rendering of decisions of fact according to fixed views of the head of the
agency,, whenever the evidence gives the slightest excuse for such a result.
"It is of the first importance, therefore, that the top administrative personnel
make clear to their subordinates that what is expected of them is not a recoid
of 'results,' but fair adjudication whatever the result of such adjudication
may be."
Separation of Functions
The report holds that the problem of the separation of functions involved
in quasi-judicial action cannot be solved by the mechanical application of general principles. On the one hand are the considerations that are generalized
into the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. On the other
hand are the considerations making for effectiveness in carrying out the
policies that have been confided to the agency. In each case, the solution depends upon a wise balancing of these and other considerations in the particular
circumstances.
One of the most important reforms in this regard recommended by Mr.
Benjamin concerns the State Labor Relations Board. The grounds of his
recommendations, however, go far beyond this particular Board and have
application to numerous administrative agencies both federal and state. The
report recommends that, in place of the present unitary board exercising
investigatory, prosecuting, and adjudicatory powers, there be established two
boards, independent of each other and each consisting of three members appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and removable by the Governor for cause. There would also be corresponding
terms of office for members of the two boards, so that the boards would be
made up, in the same proportions, of appointees of the same appointing
power.
One of the new boards would adjudicate unfair labor practice cases, and also
in representation cases would adjudicate to the extent necessary to determine facts (including the adjudication of objections to the conduct of elections of bargaining representatives). Theobother board would exercise all
other functions, including the investigation of charges of unfair labor prac-
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tices and of controversies concerning the representation of employees; the
determination whether to issue complaints, and the issuance thereof; the litigation of unfair labor practice cases before the other board; the presentation
of evidence at hearings in representation cases; the conduct of elections; and
the litigation of all enforcement and other proceedings in court. Each board
would have separate personnel and staff, and would make its own rules
and regulations within the sphere of its authority.
The principal objection heard by Mr. Benjamin against the proposed separation of functions is that it would unduly impair administrative responsibility
and effectiveness. To be sure, he points out, this objection has cogency when
applied to agencies such as the Public Service Commission and the Insurance
Department which are charged with the continuing regulation of a field of industrial or business activity. But the machinery set up by the Labor Relations Act is different and is essentially the machinery of litigation and adjudication. On the basis of testimony taken at formal hearings, and upon
issues framed by pleadings, the Labor Relations Board determines whether
the Act has been violated by an employer. The Board may then order the employer to cease and desist, and in certain instances orders affirmative action
in the form of reinstatement of employees with back pay. In representation cases the Board's functions are still essentially adjudicatory, except in
the case of the mechanical conduct of elections.
The basic consideration in favor of a separation of functions, Commissioner Benjamin finds, is that their present combination "creates, if not
actual prejudgment and bias in adjudication, at least the appearance of prejudgment and bias." The present union of powers has its effect both on the
informal and the formal procedures of the Board. Thus, when an informal
settlement of the issues is attempted prior to hearing, inevitable pressure,
whether voiced or not, is felt by the employer who fears that if not adjusted
to the Board's liking the case will be later decided adversely. A settlement
reached in such an atmosphere is tainted with the duress inherent in the
existing method and can scarcely promote genuine industrial peace.
The formal procedures of the Labor Relations Board are also today less
effective than need be. For example, an employer can have little confidence
that the litigated issues will be wholly free from prejudgment when the
member of the Board who authorized the issuance of the complaint participates in the decision of the case. Even if this member were free from any
bias, the employer would rarely so believe. This undesirable situation would
be largely cured by the adoption of Mr. Benjamin's recommendation to separate the functions. Likewise eliminated would be the present spectacle of a
Board attorney prosecuting the employer who is on trial before an examiner
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of the same Board. Such a situation, whatever explanations may be offered,
causes the employer to believe that the proceedings are formalistic only.
Unless the employer and the employee both have confidence in the fairness of
the proceedings, any decision by the Board will not be accepted with the
sportsmanlike willingness that must exist if harmony is to prevail in American
factories.
On the other hand, the Commissioner is not of the opinion that unitary
boards should always be dichotomized when adjudication is involved. For
instance, the Public Service Commission, in fixing rates, conducts hearings
resembling court proceedings. However, these hearings are not, as is true
of those of the Labor Relations Board, directed primarily to the determination
of justiciable questions of fact or law; rather, rate-fixing procedure is fundamentally legislative in nature and hence the Public Service Commission's
hearings are basically for the purpose of "providing the foundation for what
is in the end an exercise by the Commission of an informed judgment as to the
future effect of action that it may require or prohibit."
Opportunity to be Heard
In what instances, where person or property is to be affected by administrative action, should the party be given an opportunity to be heard? The
first reaction of a lawyer would be to favor a hearing in every case. However, Commissioner Benjamin finds the question complex, with problems of
due process and of policy present, and he concludes that no general answer
may be given. Due process, he points out, does not always require a hearing.
For example, an ordinance may validly authorize a health officer to quarantine, without a hearing, persons reasonably believed by him to have been exposed to smallpox. 2 Moreover, in certain contingencies, the Superintendent
of Banks may summarily take possession of the business and property of a
4
bank.3 However, the bank may apply within ten days for an injunction,
but this remedy, Mr. Benjamin states, has been sought rarely, and never with
success.
Although due process may not require a hearing in a given case, or may
require only a limited type of hearing, nevertheless sound policy may dictate
that government grant more than due process demands. "Fairness will
generally require that, to the greatest practicable extent, there should be
accorded to a party an opportunity to know the reasons for proposed administrative action and the assumed facts that support those reasons, an oppor2

Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N. Y. 493, 116 N. E. 355 (1917).
N. Y. BANKING LAW § 606.

'Ibid., § 607.
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tunity"to test and to controvert those reasons and those facts, and an opportunity to present and explain his own position before action is taken. Procedure that denies or substantially limits such opportunities must be justified
by cogent considerations."
The question of whether or not a hearing should be granted becomes acute
in the field of the issuance, suspension, or revocation of an occupational or
professional license. In Mr. B njamin's judgment, hearings in the field of the
issuance of licenses are not required as a matter of due process. 5 Moreover,
the interest of an applicant for a license is ordinarily not so great as the
interest of him whose license it is proposed to revoke or suspend. Denial of
an application ordinarily effects no immediate change in the applicant's status,
whereas the opposite is true in cases of revocation or suspension. Then, too,
in the case of certain types of licenses, a written examination to test the
applicant's knowledge, or an analysis of his books to determine the adequacy
of his financial resources, may suffice. On the other hand, if the issuance of a
license is conditioned upon the good character of the applicant, and that is
questioned, a hearing procedure "is clearly appropriate."
More forceful reasons exist in favor of a hearing in the case of a proposed
revocation of an occupational or a professional license. Mr. Benjamin feels
that "strong reasons must be adduced to justify the denial of a hearing before
the revocation of any kind of occupational license." He further believes that
in such case the right to a hearing should be expressly accorded by statute.
Furthermore, pending a hearing to revoke a license, the licensee's privileges
should not be suspended, except on very limited occasions, without a previous
hearing. Where license suspension is used merely as a disciplinary proceeding, an opportunity to be heard should always be accorded, says Mr. Benjamin.
Representation of Partiesat Hearing
The Commissioner holds that the right to be represented by counsel is
legally assured where the right to a hearing is accorded by statute or is required by due process of law; and, in any event, the right to counsel should be
recognized as a matter of policy. This recognition he finds to be the existing
practice. 6 However, the Commissioner declares, the right to be represented
'He states that in view of the remedy available by a judicial proceeding in the nature of
mandamus, the dictum to the contrary in Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110, 43 Sup. Ct.
436 (1922), would probably not be followed in a case arising in New York.
It is not, however, the universal practice in the federal jurisdiction. Thus, the SELEcTIvE SFzvlcE REGULATIONS, § 625.2 provide that: "No registrant may be represented before
the local board by an attorney." Attorneys are also barred from representing a registrant
before an appeal board (see Official Bulletin of Information for Persons Registered, Form

5), although there does not appear to be any Regulation on this score. The abuse arising
from the present denial of the right to counsel has been pointed out by Judge Mandelbaum
in United States ex rel. Dick v. Joseph, decided by the District Court for the Southern
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does not necessarily include a right to select any representative whom the
party may choose.
It is generally recognized, claims Mr. Benjamin, that an administrative
agency has power, even in the absence of specific statutory authorization, to
restrict practice before it, whether by lawyers or laymen, to such as may
qualify, in character, training, and knowledge, for practice in its particular
field. Mr. Benjamin adds that this power may be exercised by control over
original admission to practice, or by preclusion from further practice. So far
as lawyers are concerned, he states, no administrative agency in New York
seeks to impose any standards of its own for admission to practice; nor, so far
as his observation disclosed, does any agency in the State undertake by its
before it, or otherwise
own action to preclude a lawyer from further practice
'7
to discipline him. "This is as I think it should be.
Mr. Benjamin does not believe that the possibility that some lawyer at some
time might, in the opinion of the hearing officer, be guilty of "contemptuous"
conduct, warrants the conferring of power upon the hearing officer to discipline the lawyer. "The possibility of abuse of such power, -remote though
it might be, and the fear of such abuse which the existence of the power would
arouse, in my view clearly outweigh the advantages that might be gained in
administrative efficiency; and the fact that the problem rarely arises is an
added argument against such a solution." The proper solution, the Commissioner recommends, is to enact a statute authorizing application to a court to
punish for contemptuous conduct in an administrative proceeding any person,
including counsel. The mere availability of such procedure, he believes,
would normally make actual resort to it unnecessary, and, whatever the shortcomings of the court procedure, "it is in my judgment still clearly to be preferred to a procedure that would vest additional powers of compulsion in the
agency itself."
Practice by lay representatives raises other problems. Mr. Benjamin concludes that the point at which practice before administrative agencies becomes
District of New York on May 9, 1942. More recently the conviction of a lawyer, who was
alleged to have accepted a fee upon the understanding that he would obtain the deferment
of a registrant, evoked the extraordinary statement from Col. Arthur V. McDermott,
director of Selective Service in New York City, that the public would now "realize the
futility of paying a fee to a lawyer for representing a registrant before a local board....
The Selective Service system insures so many safeguards for the protection of registrants
and their dependents that no lawyer is necessary in any event." American Law and Lawycrs, Oct. 31, 1942.
7The situation, however, is not so happy in the case of all federal boards and bureaus.
For example, the Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board (Art. II, Section
31, Series 2) provide that: "Contemptuous conduct at any hearing before a Trial Examiner
or before the Board shall be ground for exclusion from the hearing." The Board has held
that this Regulation apiblies to lawyers as well as laymen, and has exercised its authority
accordingly. Matter of Weirton Steel Company, 8 N. L. R. B. 581 (1938).
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8
"the practice of law", and therefore prohibited to laymen, cannot be clearly
ascertained from the decided cases. He thinks that definition of the practice
of law must be left to further judicial decisions, and he points out that representation by laymen does not present a problem of any magnitude in most
of the administrative agencies of the State. He admits, however, that in a
few instances lay practice is considerable. Thus; statutory authorization is
given for lay representation in workmen's compensation and unemployment
insurance cases. Moreover, in certain other fields there are instances of lay
practice not specifically authorized by statute. For example, certified public
accountants frequently appear before the Income Tax Bureau and the Corporation Tax Bureau; and, in proceedings before the State Labor Relations
9
Board, unions are not infrequently represented by their business agents.
In the Commissioner's view, the question of lay practice resolves itself into
the problem of the extent to which the parties to an administrative proceeding ought to be restricted in their free choice of representatives "for their
own protection against improper or inadequate representation, and for the
protection of the agencies themselves against the incompetent or improper
presentation of matters before them." The Commissioner holds that the
answers to the problem will vary in different fields. "In some fields the
answer will be to prohibit lay practice altogether; in others, to permit lay
practice in certain types of proceeding but not in all, or by certain kinds of
laymen but not by all; in still others, to permit lay practice without such
specific limitations. Where lay practice is permitted, it will generally be
desirable to impose requirements of character and capacity for admission to
practice, and to provide for disbarment and other disciplinary controls over
those who are admitted."
The problem of lay practice, states Mr. Benjamin, is too complex to be
solved summarily. He thinks that in some instances lay representation
should be permitted, and he does not agree with the suggestion, sometimes
made, that there should be a general statutory prohibition against lay practice.
Nor does he agree with an alternative suggestion that lay practice be prohibited where a proceeding involves the decision of questions of law, or where
it involves the preparation of a record which may be the basis for judicial
review. Either of these tests, he says, would exclude lay representation
almost entirely, and therefore exclude it in some situations where he believes

SN. Y. PENAL LAW.

Art. 24.

Ina recent case the State Labor Relations Board unanimously overruled an employer's
objection to a union appearing by a lay business agent. The union official cross-examined
the employer's witness, introduced exhibits, conducted direct examination of witnesses
for the union, and performed all other functions, however inexpertly, that a lawyer would
perform. Matter of W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc., N. Y. S. L. R. B., April 21, 1942.
9
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it not undesirable. Of course, as Mr. Benjamin points out, no administrative
agency can authorize by its rules what would otherwise be unlawful practice
of the law.
Evidence
Administrative problems in respect of evidence relate principally to questions of: (a) admissibility, and (b) the kind of evidence necessary to support
a determination.
Mr. Benjamin is of the opinion that the present rule, whereby the mere
admission of evidence that would be excluded in a court does not vitiate the
proceeding, is clearly desirable. In defense of this opinion he adduces several
reasons. First, the law of evidence is "unsystematized, difficult to understand
in detail, and difficult to apply." Hence, under a strict rule, confusion would
be worse confounded where the hearing officer is not a lawyer or where the
parties are not represented by lawyers. But even if the hearing officer were
an expert in the law of evidence, Mr. Benjamin believes the present practice
should obtain, because the exclusion of evidence, whose actual probative
value could be appraised with reasonable accuracy, "is far more likely to
lead to the wrong result than the admission of such evidence would be." "A
trained hearing officer's ,experience, and his familiarity with the particular field
of inquiry, should often enable him to appraise more accurately the weight
properly to be accorded to such evidence than could a jury or even a judge
unfamiliar with the field of litigation."
In the second place, emphasizes the Commissioner, the speed with which it is
often imperative to bring on quasi-judicial proceedings, and the frequently
long distance from the scene of events to the place of hearing, make it difficult to prepare for trial in the manner customary in court proceedings, Thus,
as a practical matter, it is often necessary to be satisfied in an administrative
prodeeding with something less than the theoretically best evidence.
In the next place, in some types of quasi-judicial hearings (e.g., application for a certificate of public convenience for an omnibus line, or an application for a liquor license) it is desirable, says the Commissioner, to permit
members of the public to express their views freely. The weight to be
accorded to such testimony can safely, he believes, be left to the board.
Finally, the application of the exclusionary rules to proof by an agency of
matters within the scope of its own expert knowledge would, Mr. Benjamin
maintains, frequently cause great delay, sometimes to the point of defeating
effective action.
The other principal problem in the field of evidence has to do with the kind
of evidence which is required to support the decision. Between the "legal
residuum" rule, established under that name in 1916 in Matter of Carroll
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v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 10 and the "substantial evidence" rule, developed in
the federal jurisdiction, Mr. Benjamin prefers the latter. As a matter.of fact,
the modern trend in New York, he finds, is to relax the "legal residuum" rule
even in the field of hearsay," and thus to approach the "substantial evidence"
rule.
This is not to say, however, that Mr. Benjamin believes that a reviewing
court should countenance any conceivable supporting evidence. On the contrary, Mr. Benjamin states that a reviewing court should apply some standard to determine the qualitative sufficiency of the evidence. The freedom of
administrative tribunals to accept evidence without regard to the exclusionary
rules that control in judicial proceedings requires a safeguard against
abuse. Such a safeguard Mr. Benjamin believes available in a wise application of the "substantial evidence" rule, which type of evidence has been
described by Judge Learned Hand as that "on which responsible persons
2
are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."'
The most important charge that Mr. Benjamin levels against the "legal
residuum" rule is that it "ignores the circumstance that the residuum of legal
evidence which is required to support a finding may in fact have played little
or no part in the actual decision under review,-that that decision may in fact
have been based largely or wholly on other logically probative but technically
incompetent evidence." Furthermore, says the Commissioner, the attempt to
divide questions of qualitative sufficiency and quantitative sufficiency is artificial because the two questions are in a real sense one, and ought to be determined together. "This the substantial evidence rule permits, where the legal
residuum rule does not."
Decision
On the subject of decisions made by administrative boards, Mr. Benjamin
states that in the entire quasi-judicial realm the process of decision "is of
paramount importance." "Unless the administrator approaches the decision
impartially, with an intention to decide the case on the merits, and unless the
procedure for decision is adapted to reaching the correct result, all that has
been sought to be accomplished by proper procedure in the earlier stages of the
quasi-judicial proceeding is likely to be lost."
The fact that the statute may free the board from control by the legal
exclusionary rules of evidence imposes a corresponding obligation upon the
'administrative judge to appraise properly the quality of the evidence and the
10218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916).
nCiing Matter of Heaney v. McGoldrick, 286 N. Y. 38, 35 N. E. (2d) 641 (1941).

"National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862, 873
(C. C. A. 2d,1938).
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weight to be accorded to it. Moreover, if judicial review of factual findings
is to be limited (and Mr. Benjamin, as will appear hereafter, thinks it should
be), such limitation must be on the assumption that the administrative judge
will determine the case on his own deliberate judgment as to the preponderance of the evidence, unaffected by other considerations--"that he will not look
for evidence which will sustain on judicial review a decision actually reached
on other grounds."'' 3
The primary question of method is how the deciding officer is to become
acquainted with the evidence and the arguments of the parties. Of course, if
the sole'deciding officer presides at the hearing, no difficulty on this score
arises. But often the hearing officer is not the deciding officer, or he is only
one member of a board that is to pass on the issues. ' Mr. Benjamin recognizes in his report that there exists no method by which a deciding officer who
has not been at a hearing can be as fully informed as if he had. But practical
considerations of fiscal policy and human physical limitations frequently make
it impossible for the deciding authority either to be present at all hearings
or even to have a detailed knowledge of all evidence taken at every hearing.
In such situations the deciding authority must largely rely on reports by the
hearing officers, and also, in many instances, on the assistance of a staff whose
task is to marshal and digest the evidence for the consideration of the deciding
authority.
The ideal system of staff assistance, Mr. Benjamin maintains, would be
modeled on that by which a judge uses the services of a law secretary. Thus,
the aid of the administrative staff would not be partisan in nature and would
be limited to legal research as far as possible. Such research "involves less
danger than assistance on questions of fact or of the exercise of discretion."
Furthermore, "it is important to the quality of the assistant's work that he
should have full access to all the materials of decision and should be instructed to use them all,-for example, that he should not summarize the evidence in the record without also hearing whatever argument is made and
reading whatever briefs are filed. It is important, again, that the assistant
should be instructed to confine himself to matters in the record; otherwise,
without the knowledge of the deciding officer, matter not in the record may
reach him in that way."' 4
"Nothing is so exasperating to a practicing lawyer as the ingenious combing of the

record by the deciding officer in a strained and tenacious effort to build up a decision
against the party affected, no matter what twists are necessary and with utter disregard
of a body of contrary evidence sufficient to convince any jury or judge of a court. The
former Chief Justice Hughes, on one occasion in addressing the American Law Institute,
referred to this vicious practice as "a mere sorting of facts to suit a preconception of
policy." 26 A. B. A. J.473 (1940).
"Commissioner Benjamin is of the opinion that an administrative adjudication is valid
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JUDICIAL REVIEW

Commissioner Benjamin states in his report 15 that the subject of judicial
review lay at the foundation of his appointment to make the present report.
And, in truth, the importance of the problems implicit in the judicial review
of administrative decisions can scarcely be overestimated. The impact of
administrative adjudication in late years has evoked much thought on the
principles of constitutional government. By the hands of the enemies of our
inherited form of government, the instruments of the administrative method
have been eagerly grasped as tools with which to dig under the citadel. The
danger is increased by the continuing necessity under modern conditions to
employ administrative methods in dealing with certain areas of human activity.
It is obvious that the.courts cannot assume the burden of administering the
laws either directly or by means of wholesale judicial review. The solution
of the dilemma is first, to publicize such an impartial and able report as that
made by Commissioner Benjamin; second, to see to it that sound reforms are
made by those in political authority; and third, by example and courage to
instill in our fellows and our children a love of fair play.
Quasi-judicialDeterminationsof Fact
Mr. Benjamin interprets the decisions of the Court of Appeals to hold that
the scope of review of factual determinations is the same whatever the
language of the particular review statute, and that, in practice, the quantitative
sufficiency of evidence is to be tested by the "substantial evidence" rule.
Citing Matter of Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland,16 Mr. Benjamin concludes that the substantial evidence test "is thus a test of the rationality of a
quasi-judicial determination, taking into account all the evidence on both
sides." With this state of the law, Mr. Benjamin is in accord.
No form of review, however broad, he maintains, could ascertain with certainty whether the board had actually arrived at its determination after an
honest and considered judgment as to the preponderance of the evidence.
"Adherence by the administrative tribunal to that standard of responsible
adjudication must necessarily be left to the good faith of the tribunal."
in New York although the deciding officer relies entirely on a report or memorandum of
another officer or employee. Matter of Elite Dairy Products v. Ten E3;ck, 271 N. Y. 488,
3 N. E. (2d) 606 (1936). Mr. Benjamin considers the subsequent holding of the Appellate
Division in Matter of Joyce v. Bruckman, 257 App. Div. 795, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 679 (4th
Dep't 1939), to be of doubtful authority. He also believes that the well-known Morgan
cases in the Supreme Court of the United States are not of binding effect on the courts
of New York because the Morgan. cases, he argues, were decided not on the ground of due
process but on the ground of statutory construction of the provision for a "full hearing"
in the statute there considered.
'wAt p. 326.
1"282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. (2d) 247 (1940).
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Judicial review as to the rationality of the decision below, i.e., whether other
persons might reasonably make the same choice on the record, is broad enough,
he states, and will "enable the reviewing court to correct whatever ascertainable abuses may arise in administrative adjudication." A review wider in
scope would, in Mr. Benjamin's opinion, permit the court to substitute its
own judgment on the evidence for that of the board, even where the board's
determination did represent its considered judgment.
Although one might at first blush think, says Mr. Benjamin, that a better
test would be that by which the court sets aside a jury verdict as against the
weight of Evidence (even when there may be substantial evidence to support
the verdict), a fundamental difference between administrative and judicial
procedure militates against such test. When a jury verdict is set aside and
a new trial ordered, the new trial is held before a different jury, unaware of
the appellate court's decision; and if enough juries reach the same verdict
it is ultimately permitted to stand. On the other hand, the same administrative board must reconsider the same case. Unless the board were actually
persuaded that its -original decision should have been otherwise, the outcome
would be that the court's judgment on the preponderance of evidence would
prevail "over the board's. Tlhis, Mr. Benjamin believes, would be unwise,
not solely because of the presumed expertness of the board, but because the
whole process of administrative adjudication would be unduly impeded and
the courts unduly burdened by a host of appeals.
Quasi-judicialDeterminationsas to Exercise of Discretion
In some instances the administrative tribunal, after finding the facts, must
exercise a choice as to the action to be taken. In exercising its discretion the
board has, under the decisions of the Court of Appeals, a wide range limited
only by the requirement that its action be not arbitrary or capricious. The
reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment of what is reasonable
and may not reverse merely because it feels that the board's order was unwise
or inexpedient.
It is thus clear, says the Commissioner in his report, that the courts of New
York, as in their review of administrative determinations of fact, have tested
the exercise of discretion by the touchstone of rationality. Mr. Benjamin
believes this to be the right test.
Quasi-judicialDeterminationsof Law
Agreement is general that administrative determinations of law are subject
to complete review by the courts. The principal difficulty arises as to what is a
determination of law. A board may hold that a certain railroad is "inter-
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urban" and, as such, is excepted from the operation of a statute. And the reviewing court may affirm on the theory that the determination was factual,
since the legislative authority had not clarified or defined the term. 17 On the
other hand, whether a workmen's compensation injury occurred "in the course
of employment," may be deemed a question of law and hence subject to full
review."'
The report concludes with the Commissioner's statement that it is his judgment that New York State "can take merited satisfaction" in its system of
administrative adjudication. "That there is room for improvement in many
respects should not detract from that satisfaction, in view of the difficulty
of the problems to be met." Mr. Benjamin points out that the greater part of
his study and report was completed before the outbreak of the present war in
December, 1941. Although he recognizes that the State must now be concerned primarily with matters directly affecting the prosecution of the war,
he is of the firm opinion that-the present emergency only serves to emphasize
the importance of solving problems that concern the effective conduct of
government under democratic standards. "If a full solution must be deferred,
it will be all the more important, when the emergency is over, to have made a
start towards the solution, and to have laid out the lines of further progress.
It would in any event be inpossible to solve at once all the problems with
which this report has dealt. What is most important is that development
should be in the right direction. Despite the emergency, much of what I
have suggested could be put into effect forthwith, and with little or no additional expense. It is my hope, therefore, that this report may serve as the
basis for some immediate action, and as a framework for the future development of administrative law in this State."
'Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 59 Sup. Ct. 160 (1938).

'Matter of Johnson v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 10, 188 N. E. 140 (1933).

